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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS, 
INC., a Maryland non-profit 
corporation; RICHARD ANDREWS 
and J. WALKER, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
vs. 
RON WHITEHEAD, TOM GODFREY, 
NANCY PACE, ALAN HARDMAN, 
ROSELYN KIRK and DON HALE, 
Members Salt Lake Council, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 920233 
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF UTAH FOUNDATION, INC, 
STATEMENT OF AUTHORITY 
This brief of the Amicus Curiae, American Civil Liberties 
Union of Utah Foundation, Inc., is filed pursuant to Rule 25, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, by leave of the Court and by 
consent of all parties. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES DISCUSSED 
BY AMICUS CURIAE 
Amicus Curiae will focus on whether the judgment by the 
Third Judicial District Court granting the plaintiff7s Motion for 
Summary Judgment and denying the defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was proper in light of Article I, § 4 of the Utah 
Constitution, which prohibits the application or appropriation of 
public money for any religious exercise or worship. 
1 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Article I, § 4, Constitution of Utah states in full as 
follows: 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The 
state shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no 
religious test shall be required as a qualification for 
any office of public trust or for any vote at any 
election; nor shall any person be incompetent as a 
witness or juror on account of religious belief or the 
absence thereof. There shall be no union of church and 
state, nor shall any church dominate the state or 
interfere with its functions. No public money or 
property shall be appropriated for or applied to any 
religious worship, exercise or instruction, or for the 
support of any ecclesiastical establishment. Property 
qualifications shall not be required of any person 
to vote, or hold office, except as provided in this 
constitution. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 26, 1991, the Society of Separationists, 
Richard Andrews and J. Walker ("Appellees"), filed an action 
against the Salt Lake City Council ("Appellants" or the 
"Council"), seeking to enjoin Appellants from the practice of 
opening their city council meetings with public prayer. 
Appellees argued that public prayer at City Council meetings was 
violative of Article I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution, which 
prohibits expenditure of any public money for, or application of 
public property to, any religious exercise or worship. It is not 
disputed by the parties that public money and property is 
appropriated and applied to the City Council's practice of 
prayer. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 
The Third Judicial District Court granted summary judgment in 
2 
favor of Appellees, finding that Appellants' practice of prayer 
at city council meetings was unconstitutional in violation of 
Article I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution. 
A Notice of Appeal was filed on May 1, 1992. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Amicus Curiae, American Civil Liberties Union of Utah 
Foundation, Inc., adopts the facts as set forth in appellees' 
brief filed with this Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The Salt Lake City Council is not the State 
Legislature. A city council is not a branch of government co-
equal with the Legislature. All actions of a City County are 
subject to review for constitutionality and no special deference 
is accorded to this subservient government entity. 
II. The intent of a constitutional provision is determined 
by looking to the language of the provision. If the language is 
clear and unambiguous, resort to extrinsic evidence is not 
appropriate. 
III. The language of Article I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution 
is clear, unambiguous and capable of "ready interpretation". 
IV. Prayer is an inherently religious exercise and by its 
very nature and purpose is not secular activity. The Utah 
Constitution prohibits public money or support for the religious 
exercise of prayer. 
V. In order to best assure that citizens are guaranteed 
religious liberty and free exercise, the government must not 
3 
sponsor nor engage in religious exercise. Where, as here, the 
State endorses religion, supports the prayer exercise, and sets 
policy as to prayer content, free exercise is threatened. 
VI. Government sponsorship of religion creates unavoidable 
and unconstitutional divisiveness. When the government takes a 
position supporting religious belief non-adherents are made to 
feel as outsiders, disenfranchised and isolated. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE CITY COUNCIL IS NOT A CO-EQUAL BRANCH OF 
GOVERNMENT AND ITS ACTIONS ARE NOT ACCORDED ANY 
SPECIAL DEFERENCE. 
Appellant's treat the City Council as a co-equal branch of 
government.1 This line of analysis is patently absurd. Article 
V of the Utah Constitution creates three separate, co-equal 
branches of government, City Council's are not part of this 
tripartite. Moreover, Title 10 of the Utah Code makes clear that 
municipalities are legislatively created political 
subdivisions.2 The fact that a City Council may exercise some 
legislative functions does not ipso facto elevate it's status 
beyond what is plainly is, a political entity inferior to the 
judiciary and certainly accountable to this Court. The facially 
unconstitutional resolution at issue before this Court regarding 
the internal opening ceremony of the City Council is not entitled 
1
 Appellant's boldly invoke Marbury v. Madison, for the 
proposition that the acts of a City Council are beyond the reach of 
this Court. 
2
 Section 10-1-201 of the Utah Code specifically creates 
municipalities and specifies their status as political subdivisions 
of the State of Utah. Utah Code § 10-1-201 (1992). 
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to any deference. 
II. IF THE LANGUAGE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
IS CLEAR THERE IS NO RESORT TO EXTRANEOUS 
EVIDENCE. 
Appellants correctly assert that the first rule of 
constitutional construction is to ascertain the intent of those 
who framed the constitutional provision. Appellants rely on 
numerous cases for this "first rule of constitutional 
construction." (Brief of Appellants', p. 15 & 21). However, 
Appellants misstate the first principle of this rule, that intent 
is first ascertained from the language of the constitutional 
provision. If the language is clear the inquiry ends. A close 
reading of the cases relied on by Appellants reveals that any 
resort to extraneous evidence of intent is appropriate only if 
the language of the provision is ambiguous. Appellants do not 
acknowledge this well-settled maxim; rather, they insist that 
looking at the clear language of the provision is but one "tool" 
of many to be used in interpreting the constitutional provision. 
This is not the law. Extraneous evidence is only resorted to if 
intent cannot be readily ascertained from the language used. In 
the cases relied on by appellants this principle is applied 
correctly and the proper analysis employed. However, Appellants 
ignore this analysis, instead quoting selectively from their 
authority. 
For example, the City Council cites General Electric v. 
Thrifty, 5 Utah 2d. 326, 301 P.2d. 741 (1956), for the 
proposition that "the construction of the simple wording of a 
5 
Constitutional provision is subservient to [the framers'] intent. 
. . . " (Brief of Appellant's p. 21). In fact, the Court in its 
ultimate holding rejected this argument and instead held that 
intent is to be determined first from the language and there is 
no reason "to ignore or vary from the plain import of the words 
of the Constitution, eventhough events may have occured which 
probably not foreseen at the time the provision was adopted." Id. 
at 752. 
In University of Utah v. Board of Examiners, 4 Utah 2d. 408, 
295 P. 2d 348 (1956), the Court stated that if there is no 
ambiguity or uncertainty and if the provisions are crystal clear 
then "extraneous or contemporaneous construction may not be 
resorted to." Id. at 3 61. 
In In re: Initiative Petition No. 281, State Question No. 
441 v. Rogers, 434 P.2d 941 (Okla. 1967), the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court noted that "[i]ntent is to be found from the instrument 
itself. . . . When the text is not ambiguous, the court is not 
at liberty to search for meaning beyond the instrument." Id. at 
943, (quoting Hines v. Winters, 320 P.2d 1114 (Okla. 1957); see 
also, Shaw v. Grumbie, 278 P.2d 311 (Okla. 1929) ("To reach 
meaning the first resort in all cases is to the natural 
significance of the words.") Thus, the first step in 
constitutional or statutory interpretation is to give the words 
their "natural, obvious and ordinary meaning." County of Apache 
v. Southwest Lumber Mills, 376 P.2d 854 (Ariz. 1962). 
In P.I.E. Emp. Fed. Credit Union v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144 
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(Utah 1988), relied on by amicus curiae League of Cities and 
Towns, this Court held as follows: 
When the language of a particular provision of a 
statute is ambiguous, the Court may attempt, 
following principles of statutory construction, 
to ascertain the intention of the Legislature; 
but where there is no ambiguity the plain language 
of the statute must be taken as the expression of 
the [framerfs] intent. 
Id. at 1151, emphasis added. 
Appellants also misconstrue the essential holding of Rampton 
v. Barlow, 464 P.2d 378 (Utah 1970). Rampton stands for the 
proposition that where the language is clear, practical 
considerations, even those of long standing, cannot be 
controlling. Id. at 382. 
Appellants repeatedly deride and ridicule the District Court 
for its reliance on the plain meaning of Article I, § 4. Yet the 
District Court was entirely correct in refusing to look past the 
unambiguous language of Article I, § 4. Appellants invitation to 
this Court to second guess the intent of the framer's as embodied 
in the language of Article I, § 4 should be declined. 
III. THE LANGUAGE OF ARTICLE I, § 4 IS CLEAR AND 
UNAMBIGUOUS. 
Article I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution states in pertinent 
part as follows: 
The rights of conscience shall never be 
infringed. The state shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof: 
. . .There shall be no union of church and 
state, nor shall any church dominate the 
State or interfere with its functions. 
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No public money or property shall be 
appropriated for or applied to any 
religious worship, exercise or instruction, 
or for the support of any ecclesiastical 
establishment. . . .[emphasis added]3 
The District Court found this language "unambiguous and 
capable of ready interpretation.11 (Memorandum Decision, p. 12 
attached as Appendix B). According to the District Court, the 
language of Article I, § 4 is an "unequivocal, unconditional 
pronouncement", which leaves "little room for clarification and 
interpretation." Id. N 
Appellants attempt to manufacture an ambiguity by comparing 
the Article I, § 4 with the Utah Constitution Preamble. The 
Preamble begins, "Grateful to Almighty God". . . . Appellants 
argue that this simple declaration is inconsistent with the plain 
language of Article I, § 4. This position mocks the Framers. 
First, until this Court definitively states otherwise, the 
Preamble is not construed as law and is of no practical effect.4 
Second, the Preamble is not religious exercise, worship or 
instruction, and therefore no inconsistency exists. A mere 
reference to a Deity is not reasonably characterized as prayer. 
Appellants consistently fail to acknowledge the distinction 
between the clearly religious exercise of prayer and the non-
3
 This provision is not unique. Some 45 states have 
constitutional provisions, which expand on the cryptic language 
of the First Amendment. Many of these provisions also prohibit 
the expenditure of public funds for any religious worship or 
exercise. See Appendix A. 
4
 See e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.Ct. 
3040, 3050 (1989). 
8 
religious exercises of singing patriotic songs, reciting of the 
Pledge of Allegiance, or imprinting currency with the words "In 
God We Trust". This Court should not countenance Appellants' 
attempts to create false issues of constitutional conflict and 
ambiguity. 
IV. PRAYER IS A RELIGIOUS EXERCISE. 
A. Appellants' Insistence That Prayer Is Secular Is 
Unpersuasive. 
Prayer is, by any objective standard, a religious exercise. 
The definitive purpose of prayer is to invoke divine guidance or 
to address God, Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983). The 
Council's prayer "guidelines" assert that their prayers have only 
a secular purpose. Such self-serving assertions belie the 
teaching and experience of thoughtful citizens. 
Prayer is perhaps the quintessential religious 
practice for many of the world's faiths and 
plays a significant role in the devotional 
lives of most religious people . . . . Prayer 
is an address of entreaty, supplication, praise 
or thanksgiving directed to some sacred or 
divine spirit, being or object. That it may 
contemplate some wholly secular objective 
cannot alter the inherently religious character 
of the exercise. 
Karen B. v. Trenn, 653 F.2d 897, 901 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd mem., 
455 U.S. 913 (1982).5 
5
 See also, Hall v. Bradshaw, 630 F.2d 1018, 1020 (4th Cir. 
1980), ("A prayer . . . is undeniably religious and has, by its 
nature both a religious purpose and effect"); Graham v. Central 
Community School Dist., 608 F. Supp. 531, 535 (S.D. Iowa 1986), 
(It is "the undeniable truth that prayer is inherently 
religious"); Kay v. David Douglas School District, 719 P.2d 875, 
9 
Even granting that a secular purpose is present; for 
example, "to provide a moment during which the Council Members 
and the audience can reflect on the importance of the business 
before the Council" . . . (Attachment "1", Brief of Appellants), 
the Council still cannot use religious means to achieve secular 
ends. "The unmistakable message of the Supreme Court's teachings 
is that the State cannot employ a religious means to serve an 
otherwise legitimate secular interest." Karen B., 653 F.2d at 
901. 
B. The Utah Constitution Prohibits the Application Or 
Appropriation of Public Money to Support The Council's 
Sponsoring of Prayer. 
It is conceded by Appellants that public money is 
appropriated and applied to the support of prayer at city council 
meetings. Because prayer is a religious exercise, the City 
Council practice violates the clear prohibition stated in Article 
I, § 4. 
This Court has interpreted Article I, § 4. In each case, 
this Court found the challenged action could not properly be 
categorized as religious exercise, worship or instruction.6 
879-80 (Or. App. 1985), ("It would be a contradiction in terms 
to say that the giving of a prayer has no religious purpose"); 
Lee v. Weisman, No. 90-1014, slip op. (U.S. Sup. Ct. June 24, 
1992) , (prayer treated as a religious exercise). 
6
 In Gubler v. Utah State Teachers Retirement Board, 113 Utah 
188, 192 P.2d 580 (1948), the Utah Supreme Court held that a state 
law which permitted public school teachers to receive retirement 
credit in the state retirement system for years which they had 
spent teaching in parochial schools was not prohibited by Article 
I, § 4. The Court specifically found that "no public money or 
10 
Article I, § 4 prohibits the application or appropriation of 
public money to "religious worship, exercise or instruction." 
Thus, if and only if a challenged action is religious worship, 
exercise or instruction is it violative of the Utah 
Constitution.7 
It has been noted that the Utah provision is virtually 
identical to a provision of the Washington Constitution. While 
the Washington Supreme Court has not had occasion to address the 
constitutionality of city council prayer, that Court has 
previously interpreted its constitutional counterpart to Utah's 
property has been appropriated or is being applied to any religious 
worship, exercise, or instruction." Id. at 587. 
In Thomas v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 114 Utah 108, 197 P. 2d 477 
(1948) , the Court held that the construction of the Daughters of 
Utah Pioneers museum with state funds did not violate Article I, § 
4. Again, the Court asked whether the construction of the museum 
would amount to religious exercise, worship or instruction. The 
Court found no evidence of any such action and determined that 
before it could find a violation of the Utah Constitution, it would 
need to find "proof of overt acts of proselytizing. Id. at 489. 
Finally, in Manning v. Sevier County, 3 0 Utah 2d 3 05, 517 P. 2d 549 
(1973) , the Court upheld the use of public funds to construct a 
hospital which was to be leased and operated by a church-held 
corporation. Once again, the Court held there was no violation of 
Article I, § 4 because there would be no religious rooms, no 
religious symbols, no reference to any religious denomination, no 
proselytizing, nor any other activities that could be characterized 
as religious exercise, worship or instruction. 
7
 Appellants conjecture here, as they did below, a number of 
scenarios to incite conflict and hysteria. Appellants fail to 
acknowledge the limiting language of Article I, § 4. A challenged 
practice will be vulnerable to attack only if public money or 
property is appropriated or applied and the action is legitimately 
characterized as religious worship, exercise or instruction. 
Moreover, both the First Amendment and Article I, § 4 protect 
private citizens in the Free Exercise of their religious beliefs. 
(See infra Section IV). Non-government supported religious 
exercise is not at issue here. 
11 
Article I, § 4.8 
In each instance, the Washington Supreme Court engaged in 
the very analysis as our District Court below. The Court looked 
first to whether public money was spent and second to whether the 
challenged practice was religious exercise, worship or 
instruction. 
In State ex. rel. Dearie v. Frasier, 102 Wash. 369, 173 P. 
35 (1918), the Washington Court struck down a school board 
resolution giving high school credits for Bible study done 
outside of school. The Court reached this decision based on its 
view that the Bible study was religious instruction for which 
public money was allocated or appropriated and therefore 
prohibited by the Washington Constitution. 
In Calvary Bible Presbyterian Church v. Board of Regents, 72 
Wash. 2d. 912, 436 P.2d. 189 (1967), cert, denied 393 U.S. 96, 
d
 Washington Constitution Article I, § 11 states: 
"Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious 
sentiment, belief and worship, shall be guaranteed to every 
individual, and no one shall be molested or disturbed in person 
or property on account of religion; but the liberty of conscience 
hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of 
licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace 
and safety of the state. No public money or property shall be 
appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or 
instruction, or the support of any religious establishment: 
Provided, however, that this article shall be not so construed as 
to forbid the employment by the state of a chaplain for such of 
the state custodial, correctional and mental institutions as in 
the discretion of the legislature may seem justified. No 
religious qualification shall be required for any public office 
or employment, nor shall any person be incompetent as a witness 
or juror, in consequence of this opinion on matters of religion, 
nor be questioned in any court of justice touching his religious 
belief to affect the weight of his testimony." 
12 
(1968), the Washington Court found that an elective university 
course, "English 390: The Bible as Literature", did not violate 
the Washington Constitutional provision. The court in Calvary 
found that the testimony and evidence demonstrated that the 
course did not amount to religious instruction. 
"We find that English 390 was taught in a 
completely objective manner; had no effect 
on religious beliefs; was not slanted toward 
any particular theological or religious 
point of view; did not indoctrinate anyone; 
did not enter into the realm of belief or 
faith; and was not taught from a religious 
point of view." 
Id. at 194. In Witters v. State of Washington Commission for the 
Blind, 111 P.2d. 1119 (Wash. 1989), the court held that the 
appropriation or allocation of rehabilitation funds to finance 
the education of a blind student at a religious institution 
designed to prepare him for a career as a pastor was a violation 
of the Washington State Constitution. The court found that the 
student sought funds for what was undeniably religious 
instruction.9 
In each of the Utah and Washington cases, the Court found a 
violation of the relevant constitutional provisions if the 
activity engaged in by the State in supported of religion 
generally or supported religious beliefs as against disbelief. 
If the effect, or purpose, or intent of the State's activity is 
In none of the cases interpreting Article I, § 4 or the 
Washington provision did the Court look behind the language of 
their respective provisions. Obviously the Court viewed the 
language as self-evident of the Framers intent. 
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to promote or favor religion, there is a violation of the 
constitutional provision. 
V. THE GUARANTEE OF FREE EXERCISE IS BEST 
PROTECTED WHEN GOVERNMENT DISPLAYS 
FIDELITY TO ITS SECULAR PURPOSE AND 
FUNCTION. 
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides for 
two distinct religious guarantees, freedom to engage in the free 
exercise of religion and freedom from government establishment of 
religion.10 
These "clauses exist to protect religion from government 
interference." Lee v. Weisman, No. 90-1014, slip op. at 10 (U.S. 
Sup. Ct. June 24, 1992). According to Lee "the First Amendment's 
religion clauses, mean that religious beliefs are too precious to 
be either proscribed or prescribed by the State." Xd. In Lee, 
the challenged practice was school graduation prayer. In holding 
that such prayers violated the First Amendment, the Court 
undertook a thoughtful analysis of the religion clauses which 
applies equally here. 
It appears lost on Appellants that the precious freedom to 
engage in religious exercise is threatened when government 
assumes a central role in that exercise. "A State created 
orthodox, puts at grave risk that freedom of belief and 
conscience which are the sole assurance that religious faith is 
10
 Of course the language of the First Amendment is codified 
in Article I, § 4, thus U.S. Supreme Court interpretation of the 
First Amendment guarantees in instructive. 
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real, not imposed." Id. at 12. 
According to Lee: 
The First Amendment protects speech and religion by 
quite different mechanisms. Speech is protected by 
insuring its full expression even when the government 
participates, for the very object of some of our most 
important speech is to persuade the government to adopt 
an idea as it's own. The method for protecting freedom 
of worship and freedom of conscience in religious 
matters is quite the reverse. In religious debate or 
expression, the government is not a prime participant, 
for the Framers deemed religious establishment 
antithetical to the freedom of all. The Free Exercise 
Clause embraces a freedom conscience and worship that 
has close parallels in the speech provisions of the 
First Amendment, but the Establishment Clause is a 
specific prohibition on forms of state intervention in 
religious affairs with no precise counterpart in the 
speech provisions. The explanation lies in the lesson 
of history that was and is the inspiration for the 
Establishment Clause, the lesson that in the hands of 
government what might begin as a tolerant expression of 
religious views may end in a policy to indoctrinate and 
coerce. 
Id. Citations omitted. 
Few scenarios of state-sponsored religious exercise could be 
more violative of the principles espoused above then the City 
Council prayer at issue here. 
One timeless lesson is that if citizens are subjected to 
State-sponsored religious exercises, the State disavows it's 
own duty to guard and respect that sphere of inviolable 
conscience and belief which is the mark of free people. To 
compromise that principle today, would be to deny our own 
tradition and forfeit our standing to urge others to secure 
the protections of that tradition for themselves. Id. at 
12-13. 
The record here reveals not only State support for and 
sponsorship of prayer, but attempts by the State to proscribe the 
content of the prayers through official policy. (Brief of 
Appellant's, Attachment 1). 
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The City Council has argued that their prayer policy is 
intended to include "all points of view", "a wide variety of 
prayers" and "diversity." (Brief of Appellant's p. 7, f10). 
This goal only furthers state involvement with impermissible 
religious activity: "Nor does it solve the problem to say that 
the State should promote a 'diversity' of religious views; that 
position would necessarily compel the government and, inevitably, 
the Courts to make wholly inappropriate judgments about the 
number of religions the State should sponsor and the relative 
frequency with which it should sponsor each." Jd. at 9 (Souter, 
JJ., concurring). 
In short, the government must remain neutral in matters of 
religion. The province of government is to govern. Fortunately, 
government also has the right and duty to protect the free 
exercise of its citizens. That is the promise of the Free 
Exercise Clause. The State can and should accommodate the free 
exercise of religion "by relieving people from generally 
applicable rules that interfere with their religious 
callings."11 Jd. at 19 (Souter, JJ., concurring). 
11
 See e.g. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (Where 
Court held that a state's denial of unemployment insurance benefits 
to Appellant based on her refusal to work on Saturday due to her 
religious beliefs was "unconstitutional denial of Appellants free 
exercise); West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnett, 319 
U.S. 624 (1943) (Where Court held that a Board of Education 
Resolution ordering the Pledge of Allegiance become a regular part 
of the program of activities) in the public schools was an 
unconstitutional infringement on free exercise of Jehovah's 
Witnesses); Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946) (Where 
Court held that religious pacifists were eligible for citizenship 
in the United States and would not be required to take the usual 
oath to bear arms); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Where 
16 
Accommodation is not unlimited. The appropriate scope is 
defined by the requirement that any accommodation must "lift a 
discernible burden on the free exercise of religion." Lee v. 
Weisman, at 21 (Souter JJ., concurring). "Concern for the 
position of religious individuals in the modern regulatory State, 
cannot justify official solicitude for a religious practice 
unburdened by general rules; such gratuitous largesse would 
effectively favor religion over disbelief." Id. Justice Souter 
then counters an argument apparently made with a straight face by 
Appellants: that omitting prayers would violate the free speech 
rights of City Council Members. (Brief of Appellant's p. 17). 
To paraphrase Justice Souter: "[religious City Council members] 
cannot complain that omitting prayers from their [City Council 
meeting] would, in any realistic sense, "burden" their spiritual 
callings. To be sure, many of them invest the [meeting] with 
spiritual significance, but they may express their religious 
feelings about it before and after the [meeting]. They may even 
organize a privately sponsored [prayer] if they desire the 
company of like minded [City Council members]. Id. at 21-22. 
Essentially, what Appellants seek is protection for impermissible 
religious exercise which otherwise is wholly available to them 
without government interference or proscription. This is not 
merely accommodation but sponsorship. "Because they accordingly 
have no need for the machinery of the State to affirm their 
Court held that the state could not compel attendance at public 
secondary schools of Amish children). 
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beliefs, the government sponsorship of prayer . . is most 
reasonably understood as an official endorsement of religion and, 
in this instance, of theistic religion.11 Id. The significant 
distinction between endorsement and accommodation must be honored 
by the City Council. The City Council has an obligation to 
uphold the guarantee of religious liberty which requires the 
Council not to intrude into matters of religion. 
The distinct guarantees embodied in the First Amendment and 
in Article I, § 4 will, "through vigorous enforcement 'promote 
and assure the fullest possible scope of religious liberty and 
tolerance for all and . . . nurture the conditions which secure 
the best hope of attainment of that end.'" Id. at 7 (Blackmun, 
J., concurring) quoting Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 
U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
VI. GOVERNMENT SPONSORED PRAYER CREATES 
UNAVOIDABLE AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
DIVISIVENESS AND ISOLATION. 
City Council prayer has generated much public 
discussion.12 "Numerous letters to the Editor and Editorials 
have appeared in newspapers throughout the State. The Utah State 
Legislature has created the Religious Liberty Committee whose 
express purpose is to consider the amending of Article I, § 4 and 
possibly delete the religious liberty protections contained 
therein. Eminent Constitutional scholars warn of the 
12
 Amici respectfully suggests that the Court can take 
judicial notice of this fact. 
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divisiveness generated by this issue. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has often recognized the sensitive 
and divisive nature of government involvement in religion. The 
Court has repeatedly noted that the First Amendment "at the very 
least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on 
questions of religious belief or from 'making adherence to a 
religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the 
political community.'" County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 
3086, 3101 (1989), quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984) . 
When the very governmental body from which a citizen seeks 
advice or redress sponsors religious activity contrary to his or 
her beliefs, the government diminishes that citizen's status. As 
Justice O'Connor notes, "[ejndorsement sends a message to non-
adherents that they are not full members of the political 
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are 
insiders, favored members of the political community." Lynch, 
465 U.S. at 688. See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) 
("the political interest in forestalling intolerance extends 
beyond intolerance among Christian sects—or even intolerance 
among 'religions'—to encompass intolerance of the disbeliever 
and the uncertain".); Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 
(1961) (the state may not pass laws that "aid all religions 
against non-believers"); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 109 S. 
13
 Alfred C. Emery and John J. Flynn, Rush To Amend Utah 
Constitution Invites Divisive Religious Assault, Salt Lake Tribune, 
May 11, 1991 at A9, attached as Appendix C. 
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Ct. 890,896 (1989) ("the Constitution prohibits, at the very 
least, legislation that constitutes an endorsement of one or 
another set of religious beliefs or of religion generally.") 
The above analysis is apt in this context. A City Council 
meeting is a intimate forum. Citizens address directly their 
elected representatives, air grievances or request consideration 
or redress. There is an immediacy absent from other legislative 
settings.14 The Court's instructions are clear: government 
action which has the effect of penalizing of favoring religious 
belief is unconstitutional. That is the effect of City Council 
prayer. This effect coupled with the expansive prohibitory 
language of Article I, § 4 demonstrate the rightness of the 
District Court's ruling. 
CONCLUSION 
The language of Article I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution is 
straightforward. In the face of clear constitutional language, 
this Court is not at liberty to surmise an intent contrary to 
that language. The sole issue before this Court is the 
constitutionality under Article I, § 4 of City Council prayer 
exercises. Historically, government involvement or sponsorship 
of religious activity has engendered divisiveness and intolerance 
of those who object. This case aptly demonstrates that reality. 
14
 While the issue is not directly before this Court Amici 
notes that City Council prayer is not akin to the opening prayers 
of state legislatures found constitutional under Marsh v. Chambers, 
463 U.S. 783 (1983). This position is supported by the U.S. 
Supreme Court's decision Lee v. Weisman, No. 90-1014, slip op. 
(U.S. Sup. Ct. June 24, 1992). In Lee the Court explicitly 
restricted Marsh to "state legislative bodies." Id. at 17. 
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The religious liberty of the citizens of Utah is best protected 
when government strictly maintains its secular function. Each 
citizen is entitled to full and free exercise of his or her 
religious beliefs without government approval or disdain. The 
decision of the Third Judicial District Court was correct, in 
accordance with settled principles of constitutional 
construction, and serves the best interests of all citizens. The 
decision of the District Court should be affirmed. 
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APPENDIX A 
Relevant portions of other State Constitutions: 
The portion of each state constitution that parallels 
Article I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
1. "That no religion shall be established by law; that no 
preference shall be given by law to any religious sect, society, 
denomination, or mode or worship; that no one shall be compelled 
by law to attend any place of worship; nor to pay any tithes, 
taxes, or other rate for building or repairing any place of 
worship, or for maintaining any minister or ministry; that no 
religious test shall be required as a qualification to any office 
or public trust under this state; and that the civil rights, 
privileges, and capacities of any citizen shall not be in any 
manner affected by his religious principles." ALA. CONST. Art. 
1/ § 3. 
2. "The liberty of conscience secured by the provisions of 
this Constitution shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of 
licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace 
and safety of the State. No public money or property shall be 
appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise, 
or instruction, or to the support of any religious establishment. 
No religious qualification shall be required for any public 
office or employment, nor shall any person be incompetent as a 
witness or juror in consequence of his opinion on matters of 
religion, nor be questioned touching his religious belief in any 
court of justice to affect the weight of his testimony." ARIZ. 
CONST. Art. II, § 12, Art. IX, § 10. 
3. "Religious liberty.—All men have a natural and 
indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the 
dictates of their own consciences; no man can, of right, be 
compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship; or to 
maintain any ministry against his consent. No human authority 
can, in any case or manner whatsoever, control or interfere with 
the right of conscience; and no preference shall ever be given, 
by law, to any religious establishment, denomination or mode of 
worship above any other. 
Protection of religion.—Religion, morality and knowledge 
being essential to good government, the General Assembly shall 
enact suitable laws to protect every religious denomination in 
the peaceable enjoyment of its own mode of public worship. 
Religious test.—No religious test shall ever be required of 
any person as a qualification to vote or hold office, nor shall 
any person be rendered incompetent to be a witness on account of 
his religious belief; but nothing herein shall be construed to 
dispense with oaths or affirmations." ARK. CONST. Art. II, §§ 
24-26. 
4. "Free exercise and enjoyment of religion without 
discrimination or preference are guaranteed. This liberty of 
conscience does not excuse acts that are licentious or 
inconsistent with the peace or safety of the State. The 
Legislature shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
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religion. 
A person is not incompetent to be a witness or juror because 
of his or her opinions on religious beliefs. (New section adopted 
November 5, 1974.)" CAL. CONST. Art. I, § 4. 
5. "Religious freedom. The free exercise and enjoyment of 
religious profession and worship, without discrimination, shall 
forever hereafter be guaranteed; and no person shall be denied 
any civil or political right, privilege or capacity, on account 
of his opinions concerning religion; but the liberty of 
conscience hereby secured shall not be construed to dispense with 
oaths or affirmations, excuse acts of licentiousness or justify 
practices inconsistent with the good order, peace or safety of 
the state. No person shall be required to attend or support any 
ministry or place worship, religious sect or denomination against 
his consent. Nor shall any preference be given by law to any 
religious denomination or mode of worship." COLO. CONST. Art. 
II, § 4. 
6. "The exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and 
worship, without discrimination, shall forever be free to all 
persons in the state; provided, that the right hereby declared 
and established, shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of 
licentiousness, or to justify practices inconsistent with the 
peace and safety of the state." CONN. CONST. Art. VII, § 8. 
7. "Although it is the duty of all men frequently to 
assemble together for the public worship of Almighty God; and 
piety and morality, on which the prosperity of communities 
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depends, are hereby promoted; yet no man shall or ought to be 
compelled to attend any religious worship, to contribute to the 
erection or support of any place of worship, or to the 
maintenance of any ministry, against his own free will and 
consent; and no power shall or ought to be vested in or assumed 
by any magistrate that shall in any case interfere with, or in 
any manner control the rights of conscience, in the free exercise 
of religious worship, nor a preference given by law to any 
religious societies, denominations, or modes of worship." DEL. 
CONST. Art. I, § 1. 
8. "Religious freedom.-There shall be no law respecting the 
establishment of religion or prohibiting or penalizing the free 
exercise thereof. Religious freedom shall not justify practices 
inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety. No revenue of 
the state or any political subdivision or agency thereof shall 
ever be taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly in 
aid of any church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid of 
any sectarian institution." FLA. CONST. Art. I, § 3. 
9. "Freedom of conscience. Each person has the natural and 
inalienable right to worship God, each according to the dictates 
of that person's own conscience, and no human authority should, 
in any case, control or interfere with such right of conscience. 
Religious opinions; freedom of religion. No inhabitant of 
his state shall be molested in person or property or be 
prohibited from holding any public office or trust on account of 
religious opinions; but the right of freedom of religion shall 
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not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or 
justify practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the 
state." GA. CONST. Art. I, § 2. 
10. "No law shall be enacted respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging 
the freedom of speech or of the press or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for a 
redress of grievances." HAW. CONST. Art. I, § 4. 
11. "Guaranty of religious liberty. The exercise and 
enjoyment of religious faith and worship shall forever be 
guaranteed; and no person shall be denied any civil or political 
right, privilege, or capacity on account of his religious 
opinions; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not 
be construed to dispense with oaths or affirmations, or excuse 
acts of licentiousness or justify polygamous or other pernicious 
practices, inconsistent with morality or the peace or safety of 
the state; nor to permit any person, organization, or association 
to directly or indirectly aid or abet, counsel or advise any 
person to commit the crime of bigamy or polygamy, or any other 
crime. No person shall be required to attend or support any 
ministry or place of worship, religious sect or denomination, or 
pay tithes against his consent; nor shall any preference be given 
by law to any religious denomination or mode of worship. Bigamy 
and polygamy are forever prohibited in the state, and the 
legislature shall provide by law for the punishment of such 
crimes." IDAHO CONST. Art. IX, § 5. 
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12. "The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession 
and worship without discrimination, shall forever be guaranteed, 
and no person shall be denied any civil or political right, 
privilege or capacity, on account of his religious opinions; but 
the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be construed 
to dispense with oaths or affirmations, excuse acts of 
licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace 
or safety of the State. No person shall be required to attend or 
support any ministry or place of worship against his consent, nor 
shall any preference be given by law to any religious 
denomination or mode of worship." ILL. CONST. Art. I, § 3. 
13. "Right to worship.-All people shall be secured in their 
natural right to worship Almighty God, according to the dictates 
of their own consciences. [As amended November 7, 1984.] 
Freedom of thought.-No law shall, in any case whatever, 
control the free exercise and enjoyment of religious opinions, or 
interfere with the rights of conscience. 
No preference to any creed.-No preference shall be given, by 
law, to any creed, religious society, or mode of worship; and no 
person shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support, any place 
of worship, or to maintain any ministry, against his consent. [As 
amended November 7, 1984.] 
No religious test for office.-No religious test shall be 
required as a qualification for any office of trust or profit. 
No money for religious institutions.-No money shall be drawn 
from the treasury, for the benefit of any religious or 
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theological institution. 
Competency of witness.-No person shall be rendered 
incompetent as a witness, in consequence of his opinions on 
matters of religion." IND. CONST. Art. I, §§ 2-7. 
14. "No religious test shall be required as a qualification 
for any office, or public trust, and no person shall be deprived 
of any of his rights, privileges, or capacities, or disqualified 
from the performance of any of his public or private duties, or 
rendered incompetent to give evidence in any court of law or 
equity, in consequence of his opinions on the subject of 
religion; and any party to any judicial proceeding shall have the 
right to use as a witness, or take the testimony of, any other 
person not disqualified on account of interest who may be 
cognizant of any fact material to the case; and parties to suits 
may be witnesses, as provided by law." IOWA CONST. Art. I, § 4. 
15. "Religious liberty. The right to worship God according 
to the dictates of conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall 
any person be compelled to attend or support any form of worship; 
nor shall any control of or interference with the rights of 
conscience be permitted, nor any preference be given by law to 
any religious establishment or mode of worship. No religious 
test or property qualification shall be required for any office 
of public trust, nor for any vote at any election, nor shall any 
person be incompetent to testify on account of religious belief." 
KAN. CONST. Art. § 7. 
16. "Right of religious freedom. No preference shall ever 
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be given by law to any religious sect, society or denomination; 
nor to any particular creed, mode of worship or system of 
ecclesiastical polity; nor shall any person be compelled to 
attend any place of worship, to contribute to the erection or 
maintenance of any such place, or to the salary or support of any 
minister of religion; nor shall any man be compelled to send his 
child to any school to which he may be conscientiously opposed; 
and the civil rights, privileges or capacities of no person shall 
be taken away, or in anyway diminished or enlarged, on account of 
his belief or disbelief of any religious tenet, dogma or 
teaching. No human authority shall, in any case whatever, 
control or interfere with the rights of conscience." KY. CONST. 
§ 5. 
17. "Religious freedom: sects equal; religious tests 
prohibited; religious teachers. All individuals have a natural 
and unalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the 
dictates of their own consciences, and no person shall be hurt, 
molested or restrained in that persons liberty or estate for 
worshipping God in the manner and season most agreeable to the 
dictates of that person7s own conscience, nor for that person7s 
religious professions or sentiments, provided that a person does 
not disturb the public peace, nor obstruct others in their 
religious worship;-and all persons demeaning themselves 
peaceably, as good members of the State, shall be equally under 
the protection of the laws, and no subordination nor preference 
of any one sect or denomination to another shall ever be 
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established by law, nor shall any religious test be required as a 
qualification for any office or trust, under this State; and all 
religious societies in this State, whether incorporated or 
unincorporated, shall at all times have the exclusive right of 
electing their public teachers, and contracting with them for 
their support and maintenance." ME. CONST. Art. I, § 3. 
18. "That as it is the duty of every man to worship God in 
such manner as he thinks most acceptable to Him, all persons are 
equally entitled to protection in their religious liberty; 
wherefore, no person ought by any law to be molested in his 
person or estate, on account of his religious persuasion, or 
profession, or for his religious practice, unless, under the 
color of religion, he shall disturb the good order, peace or 
safety of the State, or shall infringe the laws of morality, or 
injure others in their natural, civil or religious rights; nor 
ought any person to be compelled to frequent, or maintain, or 
contribute, unless on contract, to maintain, any place of 
worship, or any ministry; nor shall any person, otherwise 
competent, be deemed incompetent as a witness, or juror, on 
account of his religious belief, provided, he believes in the 
existence of God, and that under His dispensation such person 
will be held morally accountable for his acts, and be rewarded or 
punished therefor either in this world or in the world to come. 
Nothing shall prohibit or require the making reference to 
belief in, reliance upon, or invoking the aid of God or a Supreme 
Being in any governmental or public document, proceeding, 
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activity, ceremony, school, institution, or place• 
Nothing in this article shall constitute an establishment of 
religion, (1970, ch. 558, ratified Nov. 3, 1970.). 
That no religious test ought ever to be required as a 
qualification for any office of profit or trust in this State, 
other than a declaration of belief in the existence of God; nor 
shall the Legislature prescribe any other oath of office than the 
oath prescribed by this Constitution." MD. CONST, Art. 3 6-37. 
19. "It is the right as well as the Duty of all men in 
society, publicly, and as stated seasons to worship the Supreme 
Being, the great Creator and preserver of the Universe. An no 
Subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, 
Liberty, or Estate, for worshipping GOD in the manner and season 
most agreeable to the Dictates of his own conscience, or for his 
religious profession or sentiments; provided he doth not Disturb 
the public peace, or obstruct others in their religious Worship." 
MASS. CONST. Art. 46, § 2. 
20. "Every person shall be at liberty to worship God 
according to the dictates of his own conscience. No person shall 
be compelled to attend, or, against his consent, to contribute to 
the erection or support of any place of religious worship, or to 
pay tithes, taxes or other rates for the support of any minister 
of the gospel or teacher of religion. No money shall be 
appropriated or drawn from the treasury for the benefit of any 
religious sect or society, theological or religious seminary; nor 
shall property belonging to the state be appropriated for any 
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such purpose. The civil and political rights, privileges and 
capacities of no person shall be diminished or enlarged on 
account of his religious belief." MICH. CONST. Art. I, § 4. 
21. "Freedom of conscience; no preference to be given to any 
religious establishment or mode of worship. The enumeration of 
rights in this constitution shall not deny or impair others 
retained by and inherent in the people. The right of every man 
to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience 
shall never be infringed; nor shall any man be compelled to 
attend, erect or support any place of worship or to maintain any 
religious or ecclesiastical ministry against his consent; nor 
shall any control of or interference with the rights of 
conscience be permitted, or any preference be given by law to any 
religious establishment or mode of worship; but the liberty of 
conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse 
acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the 
peace or safety of the state, nor shall any money be drawn from 
the treasury for the benefit of any religious societies or 
religious or theological seminaries. 
Religious tests and property qualifications prohibited. No 
religious test or amount of property shall be required as a 
qualification for any office of public trust in the state. No 
religious test or amount of property shall be required as a 
qualification of any voter at any election in this state; nor 
shall any person be rendered incompetent to give evidence in any 
court of law or equity in consequence of his opinion upon the 
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subject of religion." MINN. CONST. Art. I, §§ 16-17. 
22. "No religious test as a qualification for office shall 
be required; and no preference shall be given by law to any 
religious sect or mode of worship; but the free enjoyment of all 
religious sentiments and the different modes of worship shall be 
held sacred. The rights hereby secured shall not be construed to 
justify acts of licentiousness injurious to morals or dangerous 
to the peace and safety of the state, or to exclude the Holy 
Bible from use in any public school of this state." MISS. 
CONST. Art. IV, § 18. 
23. "Religious freedom-liberty of conscience and belief-
limitations. -That all men have a natural and indefeasible right 
to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own 
consciences; that no human authority can control or interfere 
with the rights of conscience; that no person shall, on account 
of his religious persuasion or belief, be rendered ineligible to 
any public office or trust or profit in this state, be 
disqualified from testifying or serving as a juror, or be 
molested in his person or estate; but this section shall not be 
construed to excuse acts of licentiousness, nor to justify 
practices inconsistent with the good order, peace or safety of 
the state, or with the rights of others. 
Practice and support of religion not compulsory-contracts 
therefor enforceable.-That no person can be compelled to erect, 
support or attend any place or system of worship, or to maintain 
or support any priest, minister, preacher or teacher of any sect, 
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church, creed or denomination of religion; but if any person 
shall voluntarily make a contract for any such object, he shall 
be held to the performance of the same. 
Public aid for religious purposes-preferences and 
discriminations on religious grounds.-That no money shall ever be 
taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of 
any church, sect or denomination of religion, or in aid of any 
priest, preacher, minister or teacher thereof, as such; and that 
no preference shall be given to nor any discrimination made 
against any church, sect or creed of religion, or any form of 
religious faith or worship." MO. CONST. Art. I, §§ 5-7. 
24. "All persons have a natural and indefeasible right to 
worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own 
consciences. No person shall be compelled to attend, erect or 
support any place of worship against his consent, and no 
preference shall be given by law to any religious society, nor 
shall any interference with the rights of conscience be 
permitted. No religious test shall be required as a 
qualification for office, nor shall any person be incompetent to 
be a witness on account of his religious beliefs; but nothing 
herein shall be constructed to dispense with oaths and 
affirmations. Religion, morality, and knowledge, however, being 
essential to good government, it shall be the duty of the 
Legislature to pass suitable laws to protect every religious 
denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its own mode of public 
worship, and to encourage schools and the means of instruction." 
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NEB. CONST. Art. I, § 4. 
25. "Liberty of conscience. The free exercise and enjoyment 
of religious profession and worship without discrimination or 
preference shall forever be allowed in this State, and no person 
shall be rendered incompetent to be a witness on account of his 
opinions on matters of his religious belief, but the liberty of 
consciene [conscience] hereby secured, shall not be so construed, 
as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices 
inconsistent with the peace, or safety of this State." NEV. 
CONST. Art. I, § 4. 
26. "[Religious Freedom Recognized.] Every individual has a 
natural and unalienable right to worship God according to the 
dictates of his own conscience, and reason; and no subject shall 
be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty, or 
estate, for worshipping God in the manner and season most 
agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience; or for his 
religious profession, sentiments, or persuasion; provided he doth 
not disturb the public peace or disturb others in their religious 
worship." N.H. CONST. § 5. 
27. "No person shall be deprived of the inestimable 
privilege of worshipping Almighty God in a manner agreeable to 
the dictates of his own conscience; nor under any pretence 
whatever be compelled to attend any place of worship contrary to 
his faith and judgment; nor shall any person be obliged to pay 
tithes, taxes, or other rates for building or repairing any 
church or churches, place or places of worship, or for the 
14 
maintenance of any minister or ministry, contrary to what he 
believes to be right or has deliberately and voluntarily engaged 
to perform. 
There shall be no establishment for one religious sect in 
preference to another; no religious or racial test shall be 
required as a qualification for any office or public trust. 
No person shall be denied the enjoyment of any civil or 
military right, nor be discriminated against in the exercise of 
any civil or military right, nor be segregated in the militia or 
in the public schools, because of religious principles, race, 
color, ancestry or national origin." N.J. CONST. Art., I, §§ 3-
5. 
28. "Every man shall be free to worship God according to the 
dictates of his own conscience, and no person shall ever be 
molested or denied any civil or political right or privilege on 
account of his religious opinion or mode of religious worship. 
No person shall be required to attend any place of worship or 
support any religious sect or denomination; nor shall any 
preference be given by law to any religious denomination or mode 
of worship." N.M. CONST. Art. II, § 11. 
29. "The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession 
and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever 
be allowed in this state to all mankind; and no person shall be 
rendered incompetent to be a witness on account of his opinions 
on matters of religious belief; but the liberty of conscience 
hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of 
15 
licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace 
or safety of this state." N.Y. CONST. Art. I, § 3. 
30. "Religious liberty. All persons have a natural and 
inalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the 
dictates of their own consciences, and no human authority shall, 
in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of 
conscience." N.C. CONST. Art. I, § 19. 
31. "The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession 
and worship, without discrimination or preference shall be 
forever guaranteed in this state, and no person shall be rendered 
incompetent to be a witness or juror on account of his opinion on 
matters of religious belief; but the liberty of conscience hereby 
secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of 
licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace 
or safety of this state." N.D. CONST. Art. I, § 3. 
32. "All men have a natural and indefeasible right to 
worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own 
conscience. No person shall be compelled to attend, erect, or 
support any place of worship, or maintain any form of worship, 
against his consent; and no preference shall be given, by law, to 
any religious society; nor shall any interference with the rights 
of conscience be permitted. No religious test shall be required, 
as a qualification for office, nor shall any person be 
incompetent to be a witness on account of his religious belief; 
but nothing herein shall be construed to dispense with oaths and 
affirmations. Religion, morality, and knowledge, however, being 
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essential to good government, it shall be the duty of the general 
assembly to pass suitable laws to protect every religious 
denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its own mode of public 
worship, and to encourage schools and the means of instruction." 
OHIO CONST. Art. I, § 7. 
33. "Perfect toleration of religious sentiment shall be 
secured, and no inhabitant of the State shall ever be molested in 
person or property on account of his or her mode of religious 
worship; and no religious test shall be required for the exercise 
of civil or political rights. Polygamous or plural marriages are 
forever prohibited. 
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, 
applied, donated, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, 
benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, or system 
of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, 
preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary, or 
sectarian institution as such." OKLA. CONST. Art. II, §§ 2 & 5. 
34. "Freedom of worship. All men shall be secure in the 
Natural right, to worship Almighty God according to the dictates 
of their own consciences. 
Freedom of religious opinion. No law shall in any case 
whatever control the free exercise, and enjoyment of religious 
(sic) opinions, or interfere with the rights of conscience. 
No religious qualification for office. No religious test 
shall be required as a qualification for any office of trust or 
profit. 
17 
No money to be appropriated for religion. No money shall be 
drawn from the Treasury for the benefit of any religious (sic), 
or theological institution, nor shall any money be appropriated 
for the payment of any religious (sic) services in either house 
of the Legislative Assemble. 
No religious test for witnesses or jurors. No person shall 
be rendered incompetent as a witness, or juror in consequence of 
his opinions on matters of religion (sic); nor be questioned in 
any Court of Justice touching his religious (sic) belief to 
affect the weight of his testimony." OR. CONST. Art. I §§ 2-6. 
35. "All men have a natural and indefeasible right to 
worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own 
consciences; no man can of right be compelled to attend, erect or 
support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against 
his consent; no human authority can, in any case whatever, 
control or interfere with the rights of conscience, and no 
preference shall ever be given by law to any religious 
establishments or modes of worship. 
No person who acknowledges the being of a God and a future 
state of rewards and punishments shall, on account of his 
religious sentiments, be disqualified to hold any office or place 
of trust or profit under this Commonwealth." PA. CONST. Art. I, 
§§ 3-4. 
36. "Religious freedom; freedom of speech; right of assembly 
and petition.—The General Assembly shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise 
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thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or 
the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the 
government or any department thereof for a redress of 
grievances. " S.C. CONST. Art. I, § 2. 
37• "The right to worship God according to the dictates of 
conscience shall never be infringed. No person shall be denied 
any civil or political right, privilege or position on account of 
his religious opinions; but the liberty of conscience hereby 
secured shall not be so construed as to excuse licentiousness, 
the invasion of the rights of others, or justify practices 
inconsistent with the peace or safety of the state. 
No person shall be compelled to attend or support any 
ministry or place of worship against his consent nor shall any 
preference be given by law to any religious establishment or mode 
of worship. No money or property of the state shall be given or 
appropriated for the benefit of any sectarian or religious 
society or institution." S.D. CONST. Art. VI, § 3. 
38. "That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to 
worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own 
conscience; that no man can of right be compelled to attend, 
erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain any 
minister against his consent; that no human authority can, in any 
case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of 
conscience; and that no preference shall ever be given, by law to 
any religious establishment or mode or worship. 
That no political or religious test, other than an oath to 
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support the Constitution of the United States and of this State, 
shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public 
trust under this State." TENN. CONST. Art. I, §§ 3-4. 
39. "No religious test shall ever be required as a 
qualification to any office, or public trust, in this State; nor 
shall any one be excluded from holding office on account of his 
religious sentiments, provided he acknowledge the existence of a 
Supreme Being. 
No person shall be disqualified to give evidence in any of 
the Courts of this State on account his religious opinions, or 
for the want of any religious belief, but all oaths or 
affirmations shall be administered in the mode most binding upon 
the conscience, and shall be taken subject to the pains and 
penalties of perjury. 
All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship 
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences. 
No man shall be compelled to attend, erect or support any place 
of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent. No 
human authority ought, in any case whatever, to control or 
interfere with the rights of conscience in matters of religion, 
and no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious 
society or mode of worship. But it shall be the duty of the 
Legislature to pass such laws as may be necessary to protect 
equally every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment 
of its own mode of public worship. 
No money shall be appropriated, or drawn from the Treasury 
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for the benefit of any sect, or religious society, theological or 
religious seminary; nor shall property belonging to the State be 
appropriated for any such purposes." TEX. CONST. Art. I, §§ 4-7. 
40. "That all men have a natural and unalienable right, to 
worship Almighty God, according to the dictates of their own 
consciences and understandings, as in their opinion shall be 
regulated by the word of God: and that no man ought to, or of 
right can be compelled to attend any religious worship, or erect 
or support any place of worship, or maintain any minister, 
contrary to the dictates of his conscience, nor can any man be 
justly deprived or abridged of any civil right as a citizen, on 
account of his religious sentiments, or peculia[r] mode of 
religious worship; and that no authority can, or ought to be 
vested in, or assumed by, any power whatever, that shall in any 
case interfere with, or in any manner control the rights of 
conscience, in the free exercise of religious worship. 
Nevertheless, every sect or denomination of Christians ought to 
observe the Sabbath or Lord's day, and keep up some sort of 
religious worship, which to them shall seem most agreeable to the 
revealed will of God." VT. CONST. Art. Ill, Chpt. 3. 
41. "That religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator, 
and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason 
and conviction, not by force or violence; and, therefore, all men 
are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according 
to the dictates of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of 
all to practice Christian forbearance, love, and charity towards 
21 
each other. No man shall be compelled to frequent or support any 
religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, and shall be 
enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or 
goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious 
opinions or belief; but all men shall be free to profess and by 
argument to maintain their opinions in matters of religion, and 
the same shall in nowise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil 
capacities. And the General Assembly shall not prescribe any 
religious test whatever, or confer any peculiar privileges or 
advantages on any sect or denomination, or pass any law requiring 
or authorizing any religious society, or the people of any 
district within this Commonwealth, to levy on themselves or 
others, any tax for the erection or repair of any house of public 
worship, or for the support of any church or ministry; but it 
shall be left free to every person to select his religious 
instructor, and to make for his support such private contract as 
he shall please." VA. CONST. Art. I, § 16. 
42. "Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of 
religious sentiment, belief and worship, shall be guaranteed to 
every individual, and no one shall be molested or disturbed in 
person or property on account of religion; but the liberty of 
conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse 
acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the 
peace and safety of the state. No public money or property shall 
be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise 
or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment: 
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Provided, however, That this article shall not be so construed as 
to forbid the employment by the state of a chaplain for such of 
the state custodial, correctional and mental institutions as in 
the discretion of the legislature may seen justified. No 
religious qualification shall be required for any public office 
or employment, nor shall any person be incompetent as a witness 
or juror, in consequence of his opinion on matters of religion, 
nor be questioned in any court of justice touching his religious 
belief to affect the weight of his testimony." WASH. CONST. Art. 
I, § 11. 
43. "No man shall be compelled to frequent or support any 
religious worship, place or ministry whatsoever; nor shall any 
man be enforced, restrained, molested or burthened, in his body 
or goods, or otherwise suffer, on account of his religious 
opinions or belief, but all men shall be free to profess and, by 
argument, to maintain their opinions in matters of religion; and 
the same shall, in nowise, affect, diminish or enlarge their 
civil capacities; and the Legislature shall not prescribe any 
religious test whatever, or confer any peculiar privileges or 
advantages on any sect or denomination, or pass any law requiring 
or authorizing any religious society, or the people of any 
district within this State, to levy on themselves, or others, any 
tax for the erection or repair of any house for public worship, 
or for the support of any church or ministry, but it shall be 
left free for every person to select his religious instructor, 
and to make for his support such private contracts as he shall 
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please. 
Public schools shall provide a designated brief time at the 
beginning of each school day for any student desiring to exercise 
their right to personal and private contemplation, meditation or 
prayer. No student of a public school may be denied the right to 
personal and private contemplation, meditation or prayer nor 
shall any student be required or encouraged to engage in any 
given contemplation, meditation or prayer as part of the school 
curriculum." W.VA. CONST. Art. Ill, § 15. 
44. "The right of every person to worship Almighty God 
according to the dictates of conscience shall never be infringed; 
nor shall any person be compelled to attend, erect or support any 
place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, without consent; 
nor shall any control of, or interference with, the rights of 
conscience be permitted, or any preference be given by law to any 
religious establishments or modes of worship; nor shall any money 
be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of religious 
societies, or religious or theological seminaries. 
No religious tests shall ever be required as a qualification 
for any office of public trust under the state, and no person 
shall be rendered incompetent to give evidence in any court of 
law or equity in consequence of his opinions on the subject of 
religion." WIS. CONST. Art. I, §§ 18-19. 
45. "The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession 
and worship without discrimination or preference shall be forever 
guaranteed in this state, and no person shall be rendered 
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incompetent to hold any office of trust or profit, or to serve as 
a witness or juror, because of his opinion on any matter of 
religious belief whatsoever; but the liberty of conscience hereby 
secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of 
licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace 
or safety of the state. 
Appropriations for sectarian or religious societies or 
institutions prohibited.-No money of the state shall ever be 
given or appropriated to any sectarian or religious society or 
instruction." WYO. CONST. Art. I, §§ 18-19. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS, 
INC., a Maryland non-profit 
corporation; RICHARD ANDREWS; 
and J, WALKER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
RON WHITEHEAD, WAYNE HORROCKS, 
NANCY PACE, ALAN HARDMAN, TOM 
GODFREY, ROSELYN KIRK and 




CIVIL NO. 910906136 
The parties have filed cross Motions for Summary Judgment 
in the instant action. Plaintiffs seek a declaration from this 
Court that: the City Council's practice of including, for a 
number of stated secular purposes, a prayer as part_ of its 
opening ceremonies, violates Article I, Section 4 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah. 
This Cour-c, on January 13, 1992, granted the Motion for 
Leave to File Amicus 3rief on behalf of the American Civil 
Liberties union Foundation of Utah, Inc. 
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Oral arguments on the respective motions were heard 
February 21, 1991. 
OPERATIVE FACTS 
1. The 1911 Utah State Legislature merged the legislative 
and executive functions of the city government into a 
commission form of government. Prayer was not usually offered 
during these meetings for the years 1911 through 1979. 
2. In 1930, pursuant to Title 10-3-1701, et seq. , Utah 
Code Ann., 1953, Salt Lake City adopted the Council-Strong 
Mayor form of government. This form of government: strictly 
separates the executive and legislarive functions. The 
executive functions are carried out solely by the mayor, with 
the legislarive functions reserved to the City Council. 
3. At its first meeting on January 3, 1930, the City 
Council decided to open the meeting with a ceremony which 
included the Pledge of Allegiance and a prayer. From January 
15, 198 0 until October 15, 1987, the proceedings of the City 
Council reflect that a prayer or invocation was usually offered 
at the beginning of each weekly legislative meeting. 
4. In a letter dated September 23, 1937, Assistant City 
Attorney Ray Montgomery offered an opinion to the City Council 
SEPARATIONISTS V. WHITEHEAD PAGE 3 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
that pursuant to Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 733 (1983), 
opening ceremonies including prayerful invocations were 
constitutionally permissible. 
5. Beginning on May 17, 1988, the City Council 
reinstituted the practice of including prayers as part of the 
opening ceremonies of the Council meetings. Prayers were not 
said before the Salt Lake City Council from October 15, 1987 
through May 17, 1983. Defendants acknowledge that the practice 
of the City Council from 1980 to 1987 was to have prayers and 
invocations. 
6. On October 17, 1991, the Salt Lake City Council 
adopted the Opening Ceremony Policy by a vote of 5 to 2. 
7. The formally adopted City Council Policy provides that 
as part of an opening ceremony, the City Council will hear 
various thoughts, readings and invocations prior to beginning 
certain legislative sessions. Contrary to the formally* adopted 
City Council Policy, at least two of the defendant City Council 
members acknowledge that prayers and invocations before the 
City Council have always been offered and will continue to be 
offered for religious purposes. Yet, the City Council Policy 
specifies that the offering of these thoughts, readings and 
invocations is for a number of secular ourooses. These 
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specified secular purposes include the provision of a moment 
during which the Council members and the audience can reflect 
on the business before the Council; the promotion of an 
atmosphere of civility; the encouragement of lofty thought and 
high-mindedness; the recognition of cultural diversity; and the 
fostering of sensitivity for and recognition of the uniqueness 
of all segments of our community, 
8. The Council Policy expresses a preference for 
non-denominational and non-proselyting opening ceremony 
presentations. Presentation of the opening ceremony is 
coordinated by the Salt Lake City Police Chaplain. Pursuant to 
the Policy, anyone not contacted by the Chaplain can make 
arrangements to give their opening presentation. The 
presenters are not compensated in any way. 
9. Salt Lake City employee, Ed Snow, spent two days in 
the fall of 1990 making telephone calls to sign up people that 
would offer prayers at the City Council meetings. He 
indicated that the City has an extensive mailing list of 
churches which was used to invite religious leaders to contact 
the City to offer prayers. 
10. Defendant Council member Godfrey acknowledges that the 
City Council's desire and goal to have non-denominational 
prayers has not been successful. 
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11. Defendant Council member Nancy Pace on October 17, 
1991 stated with regard to the defendant's recently enacted 
Policy regarding prayer before City Council meetings, "I don't 
believe that what we're doing [offering prayers] could be 
construed as secular and I don't believe that would hold up in 
court.fl 
12- On September 10, 1991, the Salt Lake City Council 
allowed the recitation of the following prayer by the Chaplain 
of the Salt Lake City Police Department: 
Our Father in Heaven, we are grateful this 
night to be able to meet in this forum and 
we ask Thee to bless those who participate, 
that their minds will be clear and decisions 
will be made that will be fair and equitable 
to the citizens of the City. We are 
grateful for our government. We are 
grateful for the land we hold. Father, we 
are graceful for the safe return of our 
troops from the Gulf. We ask these 
blessings in the name of Jesus Christ. Amen. 
13. Although requested orally and in writing to cease said 
practice, the defendants have declined to do so. 
14. Defendants admit chat "existing city facilities, 
assets and a small amount of time" are used in conducting the 
invocations. The inclusion of prayers in City Council meetings 
results in the expenditure of public funds, assets and 
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resources of Salt Lake City Corporation. City facilities 
(meeting rooms, etc.)/ City equipment (microphones, padiums, 
stages, etc.), City resources (electricity, printing of 
programs, etc.), and City employees7 time (in supervising, 
attending, etc.), are used and expended in programming, 
witnessing and/or reciting said prayers. Said funds, assets 
and resources of Salt Lake City Corporation are utilized to aid 
in the recitation of said prayers with the knowledge, approval, 
concurrence and ratification of the defendants. 
ANALYSIS 
Plaintiffs have sought Summary Judgment against the 
defendants seeking to enjoin the presentation of prayers and 
invocations as part of the Salt Lake City Council meetings in 
that the same constitutes an expenditure and appropriation by 
defendants of funds and resources in violation "of the 
prohibitory provisions of Article I, Section 4 of the Utah 
Constitution. Specifically, it is argued the Utah Constitution 
establishes the right of citizens to have no public money spent 
on a religious exercise, ~he right to a government free of 
sectarian influence or control, and the right to entertain 
their own religious ideas free of state intrusions. These 
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guarantees of religious autonomy and absolute separation of 
church and state explicitly go beyond those protections offered 
by the United States Constitution. In expanding the rights of 
its citizens, the Utah Constitution it is argued, distinctly 
and separately rejects the practice of praying before 
legislative meetings. 
Defendants have responded by arguing that notwithstanding 
the differences in the language of the Utah Constitution to 
that of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, 
this Court shourd decide the issue presented the way it has 
been decided by rhe United Srates Supreme Court in the matter 
of Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 733 (1983), in that such 
traditional prayers are, under specified circumstances, 
acceptable under the First Amendment and do not constitute an 
establishment of religion. It is argued by the defendants that 
the offering of non-denominational, non-proselyting prayers for 
specified secular purposes at "legislative11 sessions is 
acceptable under Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution of 
Utah. Furthermore, it is argued, rhe expenditures are de 
minimus. 
Article I, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution in pertinent 
parr declares: 
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The rights of conscience shall never be 
infringed. The state shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof;. . . 
There shall be no union of Church and State, 
nor shall any church dominate the State, or 
interfere with its functions. No public 
money or property shall be appropriated for 
or applied to any religious worship, 
exercise or instruction, or for the support 
of any ecclesiastical establishment. . . . 
No prior Utah Supreme Court cases have specifically 
interpreted the foregoing constitutional provision insofar as 
it relates to the exercise or the allowance of prayers and/or 
invocations at city council or legislative meetings. Moreover, 
none of the cases cited by counsel are specifically on point. 
However, while not of precedential value, it is instructive to 
examine decisions from other state courts which have 
interpreted comparable provisions of their own constitutions. 
Article I, Section 5, of the Oregon Constitution states: 
No money shall be drawn from the treasury 
for the benefit of any religeous [sic] or 
theological institution, nor shall any money 
be appropriated for the payment of any 
religeous [sic] services in either house of 
the Legislative assembly. 
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This provision was interpreted by the Oregon Court of 
Appeals in the matter of Kav v. Douglas School District, 719 
P.2d 875 (Or.App. 1986). The Oregon court interpreted the 
prohibition of public expenditure on religious institutions 
strictly, finding it applicable even though a teacher in a 
public school had scheduled to read a prayer on volunteered 
time. The court held, as follows: 
The fact that money spent on the preparation 
and delivery of the invocation was not 
apportioned and identified as a "line item" 
in the budget does not take it out of the 
proscription of Section 5, which prohibits 
the spending of any money for the benefit 
of any religious or theological institution. 
Id. at 873. (Emphasis original) 
In the matter of Sands v. Moroncro Unified School District, 
309 P.2d 809, at 836 (Cal. 1991), three members of the 
California Supreme Court determined that governmental support 
and endorsement of graduation prayers violated both the state 
and federal constitutions. 
They refused to find the supposed "sectarian" nature of the 
prayers acceptable, insisting thar a practice is 
unconstitutional "when it appears to place the government's 
stamp of approval on a particular type of religious practice, 
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such as public prayer," Id, at 816. Article XVI, Section 5, 
of the California Constitution provides: 
Neither the Legislature, nor any county, 
city and county, township, school district, 
or other municipal corporation, shall ever 
make an appropriation, or pay from any 
public fund whatever, or grant anything to 
or in aid of any religious sect, church, 
creed, or sectarian purpose. . . • 
Judge Mosk, concurring, stated that, "[SJtate courts are 
and should be, the first line of defense for individual 
liberties. ..." Id. at 836. Two additional judges of the 
California Supreme Court having concurred in the finding that 
the practice involved violated the First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution, declined to reach the issue of 
whether or not the practice involved violated the California 
Constitution. The remaining two judges determined there was no 
violation. 
Clearly, the pertinent provisions in the Utah Constitution 
in question, have no counterparts in the federal constitution, 
and are not intended to be restricted by interpretations of the 
United States Constitution. Instead, as asserted by the Utah 
Supreme Court, the srate constitution embodies certain of the 
provisions of the federal constitution, and then expands and 
expounds on these in greater detail: 
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[Pjrovision of Section 4, Article I, of the 
Utah Constitution. . . is more articulate 
and express in assuring religious liberty 
and prohibiting discrimination, or church 
interference with private or public rights, 
than the generality of the First Amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution. 
Manning v. Sevier County, 517 P.2d 549, at 
552 (Utah 1973) (Crockett, J., concurring). 
One scholar has observed: 
Compared to the brief and almost 
enigmatic statement on religion in the 
federal constitution, the Utah 
constitution's provisions seem prolix 
indeed. Almost every imaginable protection 
for religious freedom and injunction against 
the union of church and state has been 
included. 
[T]he union of church and state is 
expressly prohibited. . . and appropriations 
of public money or property to "any 
religious worship, exercise or instruction, 
or for the support of any ecclesiastical 
establishment" are proscribed. 
Mazor, Notes on a Bill of Rights in a State 
Constitution, Utah L.Rev. 326, at 331 (1965). 
One of the principal, if not the first canon of statutory 
or constitutional construction is that if the language of a 
statute or constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous, 
examination of legislative intent is unnecessary. In Rampton 
v. Barlow. 464 P.2d 378 (Utah 1970), the Supreme Court held 
that if the language of a statute or constitutional provision 
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was clear, no resort to assumed intent was necessary. 
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Government prayer does involve the expenditure of public 
funds. i : " Council ru i spent time and money to develop 
i il'ii I . d e l i I1 iJ iem ber s 
and Cit employees i , oserve \ : ce solemnized by the 
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Defendant s cross Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
Counsel, for plaintiffs is to prepare the appropriate Orders. 
I ' l l 
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contrar , represen 
I '.. J 111:! 
J/. DENNIS FREDERICK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
/ 
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Invites Divisive Religious Assault 
By Alfred C. Emery 
and John J. Flynn 
FOR THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE 
It is with deep concern that we 
write about what is likely to be-
come a most divisive time for the 
people of Utah. There is a head-
long rush to amend the Utah Con-
stitution to enable local govern-
ments to introduce their meetings 
with prayer. In order to accom-
plish this objective, amendment 
proponents are seeking the re-
moval of language unique to 
Utah's Constitution to make it 
conform with the language of the 
United States Constitution. 
It should be noted that there is 
no guarantee that local govern-
ment prayers are constitutional 
under the federal Constitution, 
because that issue has not been 
directly decided by the United 
States Supreme Court, 
In any event, the language 
which would need to be removed 
from the Utah Constitution to 
conform it with the federal in-
cludes the clauses which provide: 
1. "The rights of conscience shall 
never be infringed"; 2. "There 
shall be no union of church and 
state"; 3. "Nor shall any church 
dominate the state or interfere 
with its functions" and, 4. "No 
public money or property shall be 
appropriated for or applied to 
any religious worship, exercise or 
instruction, or for the support of 
any ecclesiastical establishment." 
The reason this extensive list of 
prohibitions was placed in the 
Utah Constitution was the fear 
that a state overwhelmingly made 
up of citizens of one faith and a 
state with the unique history of 
being established by the members 
of one faith fleeing unjust perse-
cution elsewhere would become a 
theocracy — a state where the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints and the state govern-
ment would become one in fact 
because of the overwhelming 
number of citizens being mem-
bers of the LDS faith. 
The central fear was that mem-
bers of minority religions and 
those with no religious beliefs 
would be excluded from effective 
participation in the governing of 
the state and that the rights of the 
minority would be ignored by the 
LDS majority and the state gov-
ernment that majority dominat-
ed. Church policy, it was believed, 
would control state government 
indirectly, if not directly, by vir-
tue of church members holding 
most of the elective and appoint-
ive offices of government and that 
those members would naturally 
vote or exercise their religious 
views without the need for ex-
press church direction. 
Those fears remain today and 
are reinforced when an issue like 
eliminating the express prohibi-
tions upon religious involvement 
with government from the Utah 
Constitution is proposed. These 
fears are not unjustified paranoia 
for non-Mormons confronted by 
domination of most of the elective 
and appointive public institutions 
around them by members of the 
ments, school boards and schools 
to all three branches of the state 
government, and the elective of-
fices to the national government. 
Non-Mormon fears of church 
domination of and use of state 
power become reinforced by obvi-
ous denominational influence on 
public issues like liquor control, 
parimutuel betting, regulations of 
wineries, abortion regulation and 
the writing and rewriting of sexu-
al education manuals for public 
schools. 
If the Legislature places an 
amendment on the November bal-
lot to remove the constitutional 
barriers to undue church or de-
nominational influence upon and 
domination of state government, 
it may well be on the ballot with a 
proposal to overturn a church-in-
fluenced vote in the Legislature 
refusing to sanction parimutuel 
betting on horse races. Paradoxi-
cally, voters may be asked to ap-
prove a law defeated by church 
influence on the Legislature and 
— at the same time — be asked to 
amend the State Constitution's 
prohibitions upon undue church 
influence upon state government 
on the same ballot. 
Whatever the merit of these in-
dividual actions is beside the larg-
er point we wish to make. All the 
elements are present for a bitter 
and divisive split along religious 
lines by a vote to repeal important 
limitations protecting minority 
rights in the Utah Constitution. 
Eliminating those guarantees will 
not only present the spectacle of 
overturning individual rights by 
majority vote, but will also rein-
force the belief by many who do 
not belong to the dominant reli-
gion in this state that they are not 
welcome and have no say in gov-
ernment or public affairs in this 
state. The longstanding and un-
fortunate division between Mor-
mon and non-Mormon will only be 
accentuated and possibly be made 
irrevocable. 
Aside from the obvious risks 
for future economic develop-
ment, tourism and efforts to at-
tract outside businesses to Utah, 
such a state of affairs will do 
great long-term injury to one and 
all — both Mormon citizens and 
non-Mormon citizens of this state 
who have much to learn from one 
another. We should be looking for 
ways to bring the people of this 
state together, not driving them 
further apart by premature votes 
on amending the state's Constitu-
tion 
The emotional rush to amend 
the Utah Constitution should be 
brought to a halt, so cooler minds 
may prevail and an assessment of 
the long-term harm to this state 
and the ability of all its peoples to 
live peacefully and respectfully 
together can be made. We should 
await a final decision by the Utah 
Supreme Court on the issue of 
prayers by local governments be-
fore taking any action drastically 
amending the Utah Constitution. 
In the interim, local govern-
ments should consider an f ierna-
interests of people of all religious 
persuasions and those with none. 
A moment of silence for personal 
reflection in all public meetings 
and in the Legislature can satisfy 
the needs of those who need to 
pray for divine guidance, and 
each can do it in their own way. A 
moment of silence might also 
cause those who see no need for 
divine guidance to reflect upon 
why they so believe or to think 
more deeply about the issues they 
are about to discuss. 
In this way, time to reflect 
about amending the Constitution 
may be gained so that we may all 
consider more seriously the obli-
gations of the majority to the mi-
nority in matters of conscience; 
the role of lawmakers to reflect 
more seriously upon the obliga-
tion of their role to serve the best 
interests of all citizens and not 
just those who share their person-
al moral and religious beliefs; and 
the wisdom of the parable of the 
Pharisees and the Publicans with 
respect to the use of power to 
force others to listen to one's 
prayers may be more fully appre-
ciated. 
Those who object to the mo-
ment of silence in favor of public 
prayers at governmental meet-
ings should ponder why it is that 
they insist upon the use of govern-
mental power to force all those 
participating in a public meeting 
to listen to the prayers being of-
fered in lieu of each person offer-
ing their own prayer silently. If 
that reason is that a majority 
should have the right to force a 
minority to conform to the major-
ity's will or recognize its power in 
this most sensitive area of individ-
ual conscience, then we are con-
fronting a fundamental attack 
upon the very idea of a Bill of 
Rights. The purpose of constitu-
tional guarantees of individual 
rights is to remove certain rights 
from popular vote and to guaran-
tee those rights of each individual 
against the majority's will and 
power. 
If there is one group in America 
who should appreciate this most 
fundamental purpose of constitu-
tional guarantees of individual 
liberties, it is the heirs of the Mor-
mon pioneers, whose basic rights 
to freedom of religion and con-
science were grossly violated by 
the majority in Illinois and Mis-
souri. The basic denial of their in-
dividual rights drove the pioneers 
on their long and dangerous jour-
ney to settle in Utah. 
If the Utah Constitution is 
amended to ensure that the ma-
jority's will overrides the rights of 
a minority in matters of con-
science and the right to be free 
from the use of governmental 
power to be forced to conform to 
majority religious beliefs, the 
paradox will be one of the great 
paradoxes of the American expe-
rience and generate an unfortu-
nate, painful and divisive debate 
we do not need in Utah. 
Alfred C. Emery and John J. 
Flynn are University of Utah pro-
